Infrastructure systems underpin our modern communities, providing a platform for social and economic growth. Increasing urbanisation coupled with an increasing population means that these systems are continually expanding, becoming increasingly complex and interconnected. Therefore, a single infrastructure system now relies on other systems to maintain normal functionality. Whilst analysis methods exist to determine the impact of failures in single infrastructure systems, methods to analyse the impact of interdependence of infrastructure systems can be found lacking. Percolation theory is often used to assess failures in one system due to an initial failure in another connected systems. However, whilst this method has many mathematical applications, we show that it can give erroneous results when applied to model failure in infrastructure systems. In this paper, we propose a new method for the analysis of interdependent infrastructure systems which also accounts for their hierarchical structure.
Introduction
Infrastructure has been defined in many different terms; its societal role [29] , its role underpinning economic well-being [23] and its capital intensity and public (or quasi-public) nature [39] . Essentially infrastructure transmits something, whether physical goods, energy or information, from a place where it is available (either manufactured, generated or stored) to a place where it is needed. This``infrastructure" becomes``critical infrastructure" when its failure would have severe economic or social consequences [2, 8] .
The failure of these critical infrastructure systems can have wide reaching and long lasting effects, not only to the systems that were initially damaged but also to their dependent systems. The 2005 Cumbrian (UK) storms are good example of this. The storms flooded many critical infrastructure assets, including: 15 electricity substations, three water treatment works, five wastewater treatment works three railway lines, four major road links, three police stations, a fire station and Carlisle Civic Centre [12, 15, 24, 28] . Strong winds also blocked roads with debris, damaged structures (including one water treatment works) and caused around 1440 faults in the electricity distribution network [12, 24] . The effect of these infrastructures failures was amplified by cascading failures in networks which depended upon them. For example, from the water company's perspective, 23 potable water and up to 41 wastewater facilities lost power [24, 28] . The inspection and recovery of sites was hampered by damage to access routes, with some wastewater sites being inaccessible for over 72 h. In some cases, police assistance was needed to deliver emergency generators to a key wastewater treatment works site [28] . Meanwhile the public switched telephone network failed and the batteries sustaining the mobile telephone transmitters were depleted, not only hampering communications but also causing pump failures as telemetry signals were lost [24, 28] . In this event, the water and wastewater networks performed well given the severity; only four of the water facility failures caused a loss of supply to customers [24, 28] . Notwithstanding, this event and subsequent events in Gloucestershire and Yorkshire [7] raised concerns by infrastructure owners and operators within the UK regarding their ability to assess, anticipate and avoid these risks. This concern is echoed internationally, driven by critical infrastructure failures such as those in Italy [34] , Germany [27] and North America [38] , to name but a few.
Investment in more resilient infrastructure is broadly supported, with the UK Government planning in December 2016 to invest £500 billion in infrastructure, with £300 billion of this to be invested by 2020/21 [22] . Indeed, investment in infrastructure is an attractive Keynesian response by policy makers in response to a recession, as evidenced by the infrastructure provisions in the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act [26] . However, especially in austere times, there is a counteracting pressure to limit the burden on taxpayers and bill-paying customers. Therefore risks due to dependencies between infrastructure systems are more than an academic or macro-political concern; infrastructure providers need to demonstrate, firstly, that investment in resilience is justified and secondly that the limited resources are being deployed cost-effectively.
To be able to achieve this, infrastructure providers and operators require modelling approaches to assess critical infrastructure failures and determine the impact that third party failures (i.e. failures within a connected system) may have to their system. In this paper, we provide a brief overview of the modelling methodologies available to infrastructure providers to model the failures in their system due to a third party failure, showing that the commonly used percolation theory approach is potentially deficient for modelling cascading failures within infrastructure systems and finally develop a new approach to model interdependent cascading failures. In this paper we concentrate solely on the consequence aspect of risk equation. It is beyond the scope of this paper, but studies (e.g. Hernandez-Fajardo and Duenas-Osorio [41] ; Kong et al. [42] ) have demonstrated that models of consequences can be neatly coupled to failure probability models to generate a full risk assessment. It is worth nothing that in this paper a full risk assessment of individual assets and systems is outside the scope of analysis. We do not consider the probability component of risk, but focus on the criticality and impact elements.
Existing techniques for modelling risk
Multiple methodologies have been developed and proposed for modelling the interdependencies, or dependencies, within infrastructure systems. The range of methods developed reflects the different requirements of multiple stakeholders involved in critical infrastructure protection. Haimes [18] noted that``models are built to answer specific questions" and it follows that the models reflect the specific questions posed by specific people. Due to critical infrastructure's national importance these questions have typically been asked by governments and the methods proposed reflect their broad priorities.
These developed methodologies include: systems dynamics models which provide a logical approach for analysing interdependent infrastructure given its focus upon dependencies and feedbacks between interacting components of complex systems [6] and agent-based modelling in which the actions of``agents" (e.g. people, vehicles) are defined by a given set of rules. Agent-based modelling has previously been applied to simulate infrastructure interdependencies. In this approach system components -be they people, facilities or whole networks -are represented as interacting agents ( [10] ,31]). Other studies have used variations of input-output modelling to explore the cascading effects of failures between sectors, examples include: Haimes et al. [19] , Setolla et al. [37] and Hallengate [20] . The reader is directed to Pederson et al. [33] , Eusgeld et al. [16] , Ouyang [32] , Hickford et al. [21] and Iturriza et al. [25] for a more detailed review of these, and other, modelling approaches. All of these approaches have many strengths, particularly the inclusion of time and duration of the crises, which are very important in relation to the magnitude of the effect and the associated impacts. However, they also typically aggregate whole infrastructure sectors into homogenous entities and therefore offer little to the practitioner seeking to enhance the resilience of a specific system.
Traditionally, physically based models, sometimes referred to as deterministic, comprehensive or process-based models, have been employed to model the physical processes displayed by these real-world systems (e.g. the flow of electricity around a power grid). For a detailed explanation of these physically based models the reader is directed to Sallam and Malik [35] and Novak et al. [30] . These models can give a good representation of specifically modelled case studies, for example, assessing the proportion of consumers without a supply of resource after the failure of specific infrastructure components or assessing the extent that a contaminant will travel through the system. However, in terms of assessing interdependence, or dependence, the realism of flow based models is counterbalanced by their complexity, since their data requirements, computational costs and general tractability make them difficult to apply in real-world systems. The former problem is perhaps the most significant. Data to support models, particularly those assessing cross sector risks, is frequently spread across multiple data sets and access is often limited by concerns about both competitive advantage and security [33] . Therefore, assessing risk in one system due to third party failures can be a very difficult task; for example, a water company will have access to all the data on their system however, data regarding other infrastructure systems on which they depend will be difficult to obtain. Whilst the structures and governance for data sharing nominally exist there remain significant obstacles, particularly regarding the compatibility of systems and concerns about security. Some assumptions can be made in the modelling approach to account for the lack of data in certain areas, however, these assumptions may reduce the realism of the model and the accuracy of the outputs. These models can also be found lacking when assessing the resilience of the system, as they are only suitable for providing this information for chosen scenarios, potentially leaving communities vulnerable to unforeseen events. Therefore, for infrastructure providers to improve the resilience of the infrastructure on which we all depend, we need more accurate, yet still efficient, methods to target investment to achieve maximum benefit.
One of the emerging modelling techniques to assess the inherent hazard tolerance of infrastructure systems, either singly or interdependent systems, is network graph theory. This technique is arguably the most computationally efficient, as it is only concerned with modelling the topology of the system and capturing the interaction between different elements (whether these represent power stations, reservoirs providing a supply of resource or homes demanding a quantity of resource). Using this methodology it has been shown that many infrastructure systems form different patterns of network connectivity or network architectures [13] , with most being classified as either``scalefree" [3] or``exponential" [40] . Classifying networks into a network class is beneficial as it allows for an insight into their inherent hazard tolerance without the need for complex analysis [14] . For example, networks classed as``scale-free" include a large number of weakly connected components (with a few connections to others) and a very small number of highly connected components. It has, therefore, been shown that scale-free networks are vulnerable to targeted attack, as these will tend to remove the highly connected components, and resilient to random hazard, which will tend to remove one of the weakly connected components (assuming all components have an equal chance of being affected) [1] . Methodologies also exist for analysing the interdependent cascading failures between infrastructure systems. One of the most noted techniques in this area is percolation theory [17] , which models the propagation of node, or link, failures throughout two interconnected systems. This technique requires only the topology of all interconnected systems to be modelled and does not require complex information, which is usually very difficult to obtain, about multiple systems. However, whilst network theory is a useful tool at gaining an understanding of the hazard tolerance of a system it is not infallible. The omission of a``flow" element, and capacity, means that these models do not capture the true vulnerability of a system [32] . In a water network, for example, gravity and frictional losses as well as network connectivity determine whether a demand can be met so a purely topological network may underestimate the risk. There has been little research comparing the actual failures observed in real-world systems and those modelled using percolation theory. Therefore the validity of these models to capture real-world behaviours can be questioned.
Percolation theory approach
Percolation theory was initially introduced by Cohen et al. [11] to predict the critical percolation threshold of a single complex system. In many of the subsequent studies, the resilience of the network has been defined by the value of this``critical threshold", or by the size of the largest connected cluster (Bunde and Havlin [5] ). Percolation theory has previously been applied to the analysis of obtaining optimal paths [4] , immunisation [9] and the study of complex networks [36] . The vast majority of these real-world networks were analysed as single systems, however, in reality they are part of a complex system of systems. For example, a road network can be analysed as a single system, but in order to function normally it requires a constant electricity supply to power traffic lights. As such, percolation theory was extended by Gao et al. [17] to consider interconnected, and interdependent, networks. They provided a systematic mathematical framework for analysing the failures occurring simultaneously in interdependent networks. In this modelling approach, a series of simple steps and rules are used to determine the propagating impacts of the failure of node(s) in one network to another connected network. Both networks are modelled as a series of nodes and connecting links, however, unlike traditional network theory there are two types of link. The``connectivity links" connect the nodes in a single network and allow it to carry out its own function, and the``dependence links" which represent the dependence connections between the two single networks. In essence, nodes are considered to have``failed" if they are no longer connected to the largest cluster of nodes or lose their dependent connection to a node in the other network. It is worth noting that these``failed" nodes are those that can no longer operate, due to the rule sets of the theory, rather than necessarily being due to operational difficulties (e.g. they may not be damaged requiring repair or maintenance to be undertaken). The theory quantifies the impact of the failure of a single, or number of, nodes in one network to the connected network and also the potential further damage to the initial network through these cascading failures. In their work, Gao et al. [17] applied this theory to a series of interconnected random networks and scale-free networks.
To illustrate the theory, we apply it to two small sample infrastructure networks, as shown in Fig. 1 . These networks both consist of a series of nodes and links and we highlight the``source" node both networks, which could represent a reservoir or power station, for example. There are also two interdependent links between these networks (D1 and D2). In this example we fail one node in Network A (node number 2) and follow the rule set of percolation theory to show the impact that this has to the connected Network B and also the remainder of Network A. The``rule-set" used in percolation theory can be simplified into six main stages: From Fig. 1 , it can be seen that failing node 2 in Network A ( Fig. 1(a) ) causes the network to split into one cluster and three isolated nodes, therefore, following the rules of percolation theory nodes (and links) not connected to the largest cluster are also deemed to have failed ( Fig. 1(b) ). The failed node 8 in Network A was an interconnected node (to node 2 in Network B) and therefore the connected node in Network B is also deemed to have failed. This results in Network B splitting into two clusters of nodes, one formed of four nodes and the other five. Again following the rules of percolation theory, nodes not connected to the largest cluster of nodes are also deemed to have failed ( Fig. 1(c) ).
The remaining``functioning" parts of the two networks are shown in Fig. 1(d) .
Percolation theory provides a computationally efficient methodology for assessing the impacts of nodal (or link) failure in interdependent, or dependent, networks. However, whilst this theory has merit in certain applications, the authors argue that it is not a suitable methodology for analysing the risk of failures within infrastructure systems. This is partly due to the failure of the methodology to recognise the flow of resource in many of these networks, which can be uni-directional, and their``hierarchical" structure. However, it is the lack of consideration of the location of the``source" node(s) which could be considered the main failing of this methodology. This omission may result in the largest cluster of nodes not including a source node, as such, this cluster cannot be considered``functioning" after the hazard event (i.e. node removal) as it has no access to resource. For example, in the case of an electrical network a community cannot be considered`f unctional" if it is not ultimately connected to a power station/source. In the example shown in Fig. 1 , it can be seen that the cluster of nodes that survives in Network B does not have a connection to a source node, therefore it cannot provide the communities with a quantity of service, nor can it maintain Network A (as there are no interconnections remaining). As such, no nodes in Network B can be considered``functioning" and only a small number of nodes in Network A remain. However, it could be argued that in Network B, nodes 5-9 should be considered to have``failed" and nodes 1, 3 and 4, which were failed by percolation theory should remain functional. These nodes were failed as they were not part of the largest cluster in Network B, but they are connected to the source node. Therefore, considering the performance of infrastructure systems there is no cause as to why these nodes cannot remain in the network.
If the function of infrastructure is to transmit a quantity of``resource" from where it is available (either stored or produced) to where it is needed, then it is logical to model them in these terms. There are two factors which determine the network's ability to achieve this function:
i The existence of a connection between supplier and recipient.
ii The ability of this connection to deliver what the recipient needs.
Topological networks and percolation theory address the former, but the omission of the latter means they are not realistic enough to meet the requirements of infrastructure providers. However, if we capture information regarding node supply (e.g. which nodes are connected to a supply nodeeither directly or indirectly) and define some physical limits of the network, we are able to apply computationally efficient methodologies and capture both factors. We can also specify some simplified heuristics which allow us to circumnavigate data availability issues.
Hierarchal theory approach
In this paper, we propose a new methodology for analysing interdependent, or dependent, infrastructure systems based on the percolation theory approachnamely, a hierarchical methodology. We make a number of changes to the percolation theory``ruleset" to acknowledge the location of the``source" node in the analysis, which determines the nodes that have access to, at least some, quantity of resource. We also do not remove any nodes that not connected to the largest cluster in the network, but rather remove nodes if they become disconnected with à`s ource" node(s). If appropriate, the idea of flow direction is also included in this approach and is achieved by assigning each node aǹ`u pstream" node(s) and, where appropriate, a``downstream" node(s). We achieve this in the model by considering the real-world infrastructure system, its topology and flow directions. For example, in the case of an electrical network (Fig. 2) the Distribution Substations are dependent upon the Primary Substations in order to supply a quantity of electricity. Primary Substations will supply many Distribution Substations, not just one; therefore, if a Primary Substation fails, then so do all the Distribution Substations attached to it. Subsequently, if a Bulk Supply Point fails, so do the connected Primary Substations (unless they have a connection to another Bulk Supply Point) and their connected Distribution Substations. This uni-directional flow is not apparent in all infrastructure systems, for example the vast majority of roads in a road traffic network can be navigated in both directions. Fig. 3 shows the same two networks, as in Fig. 1 and we fail the same node in Network A (namely, node number 2) to assess the cascading failure this causes to both networks, providing a direct comparison to percolation theory. The removal of node 2 in Network A ( Fig. 3(a) ) again causes the failure of three other nodes in the network (nodes 6-8) as they have``lost" their connection to the source node ( Fig. 3(b) ). With the failure of node 8, in Network A, one of the interconnected links has also failed, which results in the failure of node 2 in network B. In the same manner as percolation theory, this causes the network to split into two clusters. However, unlike percolation theory, the largest cluster is failed in this example as it does not contain à`s upply" nodewe maintain nodes that have a connection to à`s upply" node using hierarchical theory ( Fig. 3(c) ). The resulting networks can be seen in Fig. 3(d) and are clearly different to those calculated using percolation theory ( Fig. 1(d) ).
Using Hierarchical Theory the``surviving" nodes in both Network A and Network B are all connected to a source node and are able to access some quantity of service. These two networks are also still connected via the interdependent link, D1. The cause of this difference is essentially the change in the rule which removes nodes if they are not part of the largest cluster (percolation theory) to the removal of nodes if they do not have a connected to an``upstream" node or if the cluster does not contain a``source" node (Hierarchical methodology). In a similar manner to percolation theory, the``rulesets" for the hierarchical methodology can be simplified into six main stages: In this example there are two interdependent connections, the first (D1) between node A5 and node B1, and the second (D2) between node A8 and node B2. The failed node, node A2, is shown in red. (b) All connecting links to node A2 are then failed, as are nodes A6, A7 and A8 which have all become isolated (e.g. they have no remaining links connecting them to other nodes in the network). (c) The interdependent node, node A8, is failed therefore node B2, and its connected links, also fail. The network has now broken into two clusters and therefore the smallest cluster (formed of B1, B3, B4 and the source) also fail. (d) Showing the resulting networks. From these results, we therefore argue that the Hierarchical methodology is more representative of interdependent infrastructure failures, compared to the percolation theory methodology for instances where flow is uni-directional and a``source" node is used in the system. If percolation theory is applied to the analysis of interdependent infrastructure systems, which include a``source" node(s) (e.g. electrical distribution networks or gas pipeline networks), then large errors may be present in the results which could lead to incorrect assumptions regarding the resilience, or failure risk, of two (or more) interconnected infrastructure systems.
Application to interdependent networks
We have established that the presented hierarchical methodology can be applied to more representatively indicate interconnected infrastructure failures compared to percolation theory. We now apply both methodologies to the analysis of two real-world infrastructure systems, namely an electricity network and a water network, to demonstrate the differences in these two theories on a typical``infrastructure scale".
Electricity network
We obtained the topology of a UK electricity distribution network from a 'Long Term Development Statement' which are published by the regional operators. The components of this network are summarised in Table 1 . The table also displays the natural hierarchy, as discussed in the previous section (see Fig. 2 ), as the high transmission voltages are stepped down through different levels into the domestic network. For our analysis we have converted the raw topological network into a hierarchical, unidirectional flow graph indicating which higher order substations could feed each lower order substations, subject to connectivity and capacity constraints. To preserve the flow of this paper we have included the detailed description of this conversion process in the Supplementary Information and the reader is directed to Dunn et al. [14] for a detailed process on how to create a network graph from a real-world infrastructure system.
Water network
We have obtained the water distribution network for the same geographical area as the electrical distribution network, to allow the identification of dependent connections between the two systems. The water network has been obtained from the connectivity schematics produced by the water company, and consists of a five different types of node, as detailed in Table 2 . This network data is supported by information regarding pumping capacity prepared by the company as part of their annual submission to the regulator (Ofwat). All nodes, with the exception of the source nodes, require a supply of water and in a similar manner to the electrical distribution network we need to define a set of assumptions regarding the capacity of the network components. Fig. 3 . An example of cascading failure in interdependent networks using our developed hierarchical theory approach. (a) Two example networks, where the direction of flow is from the top of the diagram to the bottom. In this example there are two interdependent connections, the first (D1) between node A1 and node B5, and the second (D2) between node A2 and node B8. The failed node, node B2, is shown in red. (b) All connecting links to node B2 are then failed, as are nodes B6, B7 and B8 now do not have an "upstream" connection. (c) The interdependent node, node B8, is failed therefore node A2, and its connected links, also fail. The "downstream" nodes A5-9 also fail as they do not have an "upstream" connection. (d) Showing the resulting networks. Again, to keep the paper succinct we describe these in the accompanying Supplementary Information.
Results of application
In this section we present the results of the percolation theory and hierarchical theory analysis to the interdependent water and electricity networks. To initiate a cascading failure in the networks, we selected at random a sample of components in the electricity network to have failed.
We tested across four scenarios. In each we selected our sample of failed electricity nodes from the different levels of the network outlined in Table 1 , our intention being to reveal the comparative impacts of failures at varying asset types.
To assess the impact of different combinations of substations failing we ran multiple simulations for each scenario. In the case of the GSP and BSP, with only a few of each, we capture all possible combinations. For the primary and distribution substations we ran 45 and 100 simulations respectively for to capture a range of results for the same number of node failures.
In each simulation we follow both the percolation theory and hierarchical theory rule-sets to determine;
1 The number of components in the electricity network which are inactive (or``failed") as a consequence 2 The number of components in the dependent water network which then inactive (or``failed") as a cascading consequence.
We address each of these in turn in the following paragraphs. First, Fig. 4 shows the total number of inactive electricity nodes (y-axes) depending on the number of failed electricity nodes (x-axes) and the hierarchical rank of these failed nodes (separate panels), Second, Fig. 5 shows the total number of inactive water nodes (y-axes) dependingas beforeon number and an hierarchical rank of failed electricity substations. For ease of communication we only count the nodes affected but this easily can be converted to a more precise measure of impact by attributing additional information such as population served.
The results for the electricity network show stark differences between the two methodologies. The results from the hierarchical approach match what expectations in the real world. For example, if all the grid supply points fail then every node in the electrical network becomes inactive ( Fig. 4(a) ). Meanwhile there is a linear relationship between failed distribution substations and the number of inactive Fig. 4 . Plotting the number of failed (a) the grid supply points, (b) bulk supply points, (c) primary substations and (d) distribution substations in the electricity network against the total number of failed nodes in the same network (due to cascade effects), for both percolation theory and hierarchical theory.
nodes because they have no dependents ( Fig. 4(d) ). This is not the case in the percolation theory results. For example, failing any combination of grid supply points or any combination of bulk supply points has the same impact with less than a quarter of the network affected ( Fig. 4(b) ). It is intuitive that this does not reflect reality because a complete failure at either level would disconnect demand from supplies. This occurs because, percolation theory does not take into account the flow of resource within a network or the ability to deliver a quantity of service, it simply looks at the largest cluster. In this example, percolation theory substantially overestimates the vulnerability of the electrical network to failures at primary and distribution substations (i.e. the more numerous and smaller) and underestimates the vulnerability to failures at grid and bulk supply points (i.e. the fewer, more critical sites). Fig. 5 turns our attention to the cascading impacts on the water network. The results of the hierarchical approach meet expectations. The failure of all connected components in the electricity network result in all demand components in the water network becoming inactive. Scatter in the results reflects the connectivity of infrastructure systems as not all electricity nodes are linked to water nodes, and there is internal variability in the importance of water nodes. There is less scatter for grid and bulk supply points because they affect a broad area whereas variability increases at lower ranked electricity nodes because they link more specifically to particular water nodes.
However, the results for percolation theory are not showing the behaviour which can be expected from an infrastructure system. For example, it suggests that some water demand components will remain active even if we fail all components in the electricity system. As previously, these errors occur because percolation theory only considers the largest cluster and disregards the importance of connection between supply and demand. The effect of this in these interdependent networks is that percolation theory underestimates the vulnerability of the water network to electricity network failures.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented and developed a new modelling methodology, which aims to provide infrastructure owners/operators with a computationally efficient tool to assess the impact that third party failures (i.e. failures within a connected system) may have to their system, without the need for a wealth of complex input data (about either their system or any interdependent systems).
This new approach develops upon percolation theory with a few key changes. To reflect that infrastructure systems components cannot continue to operate if they cannot access a supply of the relevant resource, we maintain the``hierarchal" nature of networks. We determine a node's``upstream" and``downstream" nodes and do not allow the node to continue to function without connection to an``upstream" node. This ensures that all nodes within the network have access to at least one``supply" node (e.g. reservoir, power station) so they still receive at least some quantity of service during disruption. This is in contrast to percolation theory, which determines the state of nodes based on their membership of the largest cluster, and does not acknowledge the role of supply nodes.
We applied our hierarchical methodology and percolation theory to analyse two connected infrastructure systems, namely a water distribution system and electrical distribution system. We failed a sample of nodes within the electricity network and determined their impact upon the demand nodes within the water network. Attributing the number of customer served by each node would be a simple way for infrastructure operators to translate this to customer impact. We showed that the results of the hierarchical approach were indicative of`r eal-world" systems. We also showed that in some cases percolation theory over-estimated of the vulnerability of a network, whereas in other cases it under-estimated. These differences are due to the percolation theory approach not accounting for the location of``supply" nodes, nor the ability for other nodes to be connected to these. This is important because influential, widely cited, studies using percolation theory may be mis-representing the true resilience of critical infrastructure networks.
It should be noted, that it has not been possible to validate the results from either approach against a physically-based model or indeed the real-world networks themselves. The empirical data is limited by the rarity of failures and recording of faults in disparate systems across infrastructure providers. The best information is in individual case studies as outlined in the introduction. The complexity and depth of interdependency between systems makes large scale physical modelling across multiple scenarios an intractable challenge. This reinforces the importance of developing accurate, yet simplified, analysis tools.
To summarise, we acknowledge that our hierarchical approach presents a``simplified" view of a real-world infrastructure system and therefore may not capture small scale failures within the systems nor the system dynamics (e.g. presence of water towers that may only be able to supply a community with service for a limited period). However, it does provide a computationally efficient methodology for analysing infrastructure interdependence failures, which does not require large amounts of data and is based upon a logical rule set.
